

(Revised 10/16/79)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 4, 1979

Presidential Directive/NSC - 52

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and
 Budget
 United States Representative to the
 United Nations
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Director, International Communication Agency
 Administrator, International Development
 Cooperation Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Cuba (U)

The President has directed the United States Government to continue to seek to contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change. In addition, U.S. policy should be directed at accomplishing the following four specific objectives:

- To reduce and eventually remove Cuban military forces stationed abroad. (S)
- To undercut Cuba's drive for Third World leadership. (S)
- To obtain Cuban restraint on the Puerto Rican issue. (S)
- To inhibit the Soviet build-up of Cuba's armed forces. (S)

In pursuit of these objectives, the President has directed implementation of the following measures:

-- With respect to the Caribbean and Central American region, the State Department should direct a strategy to engage like-minded Latin American governments in an effort to compete with the Cubans and increase the prospects for

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Review 10/2/99

Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski

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peaceful and democratic change. The Department of State should explore with governments in the region the possibility of increasing our presence in the area. On the military side, the Department of Defense should increase port visits and training in order to demonstrate our concern for the region and enhance the security of the region. Also, the Department of State, in conjunction with the International Development Cooperation Administration, should develop budgetary programs to provide greater amounts of economic and military assistance to governments in the region that respect human rights and democratic values, and also resist Cuban influence. The Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, should reverse the decline of FMS credits allocated to Latin America. The FMS budget allocated to Latin America should be increased in FY 81, perhaps to 4-5 percent of the total FMS budget. (S)

-- The Department of State, working in close coordination with the National Security Council, Department of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence, should share intelligence information on the Soviet build-up in Cuba and on Cuban intelligence, political, and military activities abroad with the nations of Western Europe, Canada, Japan and with like-minded governments in the developing world. (With Latin American governments, we should seek to raise their consciousness of the Cuban problem as their problem -- not just ours -- in order that they begin to seriously consider actions to curb Cuban adventurism.) We should also hold periodic consultations with these governments about measures that might be taken individually or collectively to counter expansionist actions by Cuba. The Department of State, in close coordination with the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Department of the Treasury and Department of Commerce, should encourage these governments to adopt an approach, which denies the Cubans the recognition they seek and raises the costs to the Cubans of continued intervention abroad, including, but not limited to the denial of credit. (S)

-- The Department of State should consult with moderate members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and urge attention to issues like human rights, arms restraint, non-intervention and foreign aid which could lead to criticism of Cuban and Soviet activities. We should continue to encourage the moderates in the NAM to resist strongly and publicly efforts by the Cubans to use their 3-year NAM chairmanship to impose pro-Soviet positions, of the kind reflected in the Cuban draft declaration for the NAM Summit. (S)

-- The Department of State should continue to press vigorously to preclude Cuba from gaining a seat on the UN Security Council or from hosting the next UNCTAD Summit. (S)

-- The Department of State and appropriate agencies should continue to make very clear in discussions with officials from the government of the U.S.S.R. the depth of our concern about Cuba's activities in the Caribbean and in Central America (as well as in Africa) and inform them of the costs to our relationship of continued Soviet support (or even acquiescence) in Cuba's activities. (S)

-- The Department of State and appropriate agencies should undertake periodic discussions with Cuban Americans, who return to Cuba for visits in order to benefit from the insights gained during their visits and in order to encourage the spread of U.S. influence on the Island. The Director, International Communication Agency, in coordination with the Department of State and the National Security Council, should increase the influence of U.S. culture on the Cuban people by promoting cultural tours and by permitting an arrangement to distribute U.S. films on the Island. (S)

The timing and implementation of these measures should be carefully coordinated with appropriate departments and with the National Security Council. To do this, the Department of State should establish an interagency working group on Cuba chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. This working group should transmit a report to the President each month on the status of implementing these and other measures to pursue the objectives described above. (S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski